Miners' Strike - twenty years on

Vince Mills

Interview with Harry Cunningham

Harry, could you describe your position in the NUM before the strike. Did you hold any offices? What were your initial reactions when a dispute looked likely?

At the time of the 1984 strike I was working at Cowdenbeath Central Workshops, one of three workshops that serviced the Scottish coalfield. I worked at Cowdenbeath as an electrician after joining straight from school in 1974 to take up an apprenticeship with the National Coal Board. Before the strike, I was branch youth delegate for my union SCEBTA NUM Group 2 (Scottish Collierymen, Engineers, Boilermen and Tradesmen's Association). I was part of a young leadership section within the mining trade unions since developing young leaders through trade union education programmes, was always given a high priority by the NUM in Scotland. As a result, we were active prior to the strike starting as the Coal Board flexed their industrial muscle and started to pick off pits in Scotland. We knew a national dispute was highly likely. The government was calling the tune and a new aggressive management style was being employed by the Coal Board. This resulted in several pits being involved in small-scale local disputes and the writing was on the wall for what was to follow nationally.

It is often forgotten that the Scottish NUM came out in advance of the rest of the UK. Can you describe why and why there was a ballot in Scotland but not in the rest of the UK?

Several pits in Scotland were being picked off over a long period of time. I support the view that any ballots in Scotland were a product of being able to organise over a protracted period of time. The national context was a situation that developed rapidly with a pace and momentum of its own, Dictated in the most part by external actors such as Thatcher and McGregor, the political leadership of the Coal Board.

How significant do you think the lack of the ballot was in the rest of the UK?

We can reflect from now to doomsday on the significance of not going for a national ballot but at the time, collectively and unanimously we were prepared to embark on industrial struggle without it. That is often the traditional position taken by trade unions. I still believe that decision to be the correct given the conditions we faced at that time. Those who argue for a ballot (often from a retrospective position) should remember there was nothing democratic in the position adopted by the Coal Board or the Government. They arbitrarily decided what pits were to close and who was to loose their jobs. We should remember that the 1984 strike was pre-empted by a moderately successful period of industrial action where a leaked `hit-list' of pits named for closure was withdrawn by the Coal Board after several coal fields walked out without a ballot.

Some of the left argue that the strike was not politicised enough do you agree with that?

No. Our local strike committee met for the first time within days of the strike being called and we knew that we were in for the long haul. Straight away we put into effect an action plan that raised the political issues of the strike through leafleting, meetings and street campaigning. This analysis and action was mirrored throughout the coalfields nationally. At the time, everybody knew what the dispute was about, a political attack by Thatcher on the trade union movement resulting in pits closures. Despite the efforts of our enemies to focus on picket line violence and the lack of a national ballot, the NUM leadership locally and nationally, presented a successful analysis that this was a political attack on working people and our communities. Without this analysis and the support it received, we would not have been able to sustain the strike in the numbers we did for as long as we did.

A big issue was police behaviour. You were at Orgreave. How did the police behave there and elsewhere during the strike?

For me, Orgreave was a dramatic illustration of the naked power of the state and it raised questions of police accountability and organisation. As has been documented many times, the police helped us assemble in a location of their choosing and then set about subjecting peaceful demonstrators to brutal and unprecedented levels of state approved violence. Personally, I was chased by ranks of police from Orgreave towards a local railway line. Stopping at the top of an embankment to regain my senses, a helmeted policeman in a black boiler suit grabbed me, swung his baton and said `get back in your hole'. He made contact and I fell down the embankment onto the railway line below. I remember getting to me feet and along with many others miners now on the railway line, being stoned by the police positioned above.

In Fife, as elsewhere the tactics used by the police to arrest pickets cost many miners their jobs. For example, Fife Police arrested more people in three days at a local opencast site than the total number arrested at Orgreave. This was primarily to deplete the number of pickets but cost several of my friends and workmates their jobs and robbed them of a future.

Some, again on the left of Labour would argue that neither the Labour Party nor the TUC, nor even some of the unions like the ISTC offered enough support. What was your experience?

We can always look back and say so and so could have done more, but hindsight is a luxury we didn't have at the time. The fact is that the striking miners and their families would not have managed to stay out for the length of time they did, without the support of the wider movement. Individual unions such as the ISTC were under considerable pressure not to support miners and were subjected to constant blackmail. Whilst I didn't agree with their position, it again illustrates the power of the state to divide groups who share common positions.

Some, this time on the right argue that Scargill did not know how to compromise and the deal brokered by Kinnock should have been accepted. What did you feel at the time?

Let's not fall into the trap of individualising a complex political situation. Sometimes during intense political and economic events such as that found in 1984, we act on what our heart says rather than our head. But that's reality and people do these things for what we consider to be the correct reasons. I don't see any benefit in laying blame after all this time on anybody other than the Government or the Coal Board. Thatcher was not for supporting any brokered deal; compromise was a word she was unfamiliar with.

What are the biggest positives that came out of the strike from your point of view?

There is no doubt that the outcome to the dispute was a massive defeat for working people and trade unions in this country. However, the real strength of the strike was the magnificent level of solidarity shown collectively and individually that sustained the dispute. Vast amounts of aid came to our strike centre from aboard, from areas without any coalfields such as Dundee and Aberdeen, and even from passers-by. Many people from different walks of life supported us on rallies and political platforms the length and breadth of the UK. Without this, we would have not been able to put up the fight and the political argument for as long as we did.

How can today's movement learn from that struggle in facing contemporary issues and struggles?

We in the labour movement should always look to learn lessons, but we need to do this in a mature manner without apportioning blame or creating scapegoats. Today, even with the recent advances gained by the trade union movement, such as the minimum wage, working people and their communities are still under attack. Too many of us live with the constant fear of losing our jobs, casual work and poor or unsafe working conditions. What we can learn from the 1984 strike would take up more than the space offered by a few lines on a page, however, I would point to three specific and crucially important areas.

1. As a movement we need to keep to specific, central issues in a way that connects with a maximum number of potential supporters. Too often we are detracted from a central issue at a time of complex unrest. This only serves our opponents interests. By keeping to the central issues, we should seek to create maximum support from all sections of society, including those who are not traditionally our allies. In my opinion, the miners of 1984 employed this strategy well winning the political argument and economic support required to maintain a year-long struggle.

2. The miners' strike was a response to economic restructuring of what was seen by many as an old traditional industry. Since then our economy has undergone massive restructuring and change, creating new sectors with new groups of workers. We as a movement need to develop levels of support with innovative approaches for workers involved with these new sectors thereby making trade union activity as relevant to them as it is to those workers employed in our traditional base.

3. Finally and perhaps most importantly, the need to involve and develop young people in all levels of our trade union movement. As we face new struggles, our ability to respond will depend more and more on the involvement of our younger members of society. Trade unions should prioritise their work in this area so that workers faced with future struggles will be supported with a new generation of effective representatives. The miners' education programme was always held in high regard by many in the movement. It enabled young workers to make significant contributions to the strike, to workplace issues such as improvements in health and safety, as well as wider campaigns for peace, solidarity and socialism. We should offer similar opportunities to our young people, they deserve it!

Harry Cunningham is currently Head of Programme for Trade Union Studies at Fife College and is about to take up the post of TUC Education Officer for Scotland following the retirement of Larry Cairns.